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Regional Politics are Class Politics:
A Newfoundland and Labrador Perspective on Regions
THE YEAR 2004 SEEMED LIKE a triumph for the province of Newfoundland and
Labrador. The Tory government of Danny Williams wrangled tremendous
concessions from Ottawa on the Atlantic Accord that will provide the province with
much more offshore-oil revenue. His success provoked the envy of the premier of
Saskatchewan as well as the anger of the premier of Ontario, the latter of whom
suggested that it was time Ontario received a new deal in Confederation. At home,
Williams enjoyed tremendous popular support. We were the regional David standing
against Goliath at the centre. We forgot the harsh budget of retrenchment introduced
by the Williams government in the previous year. We put aside his government’s
vicious assault on public-sector workers – a battle that resulted in a legislated
settlement, back-to-work legislation and the cowing of other unions about to negotiate
with the government. And we ignored his government’s acceptance of a Supreme
Court ruling that pay equity was only necessary if the province felt it could afford it. 
In reality, Newfoundland and Labrador’s supposed “victory” against Ottawa is an
example of how the politics of regionalism are the politics of class. Provincial
governments use Ottawa-bashing to distract Newfoundlanders and Labradorians from
struggles at home. More importantly, provincial wrangling with Ottawa is part of the
Canadian legacy of welfare state intervention to cultivate popular consent for the
structural inequalities of capitalism. Such wrangling mystifies the effects of such
inequalities by making them appear to be the problems of Confederation rather than
that of capitalism.
In 1949, there was more of a sense of class grievance in the popular support for
Confederation. We can see this in the public persona that J.R. Smallwood constructed
for himself during the campaigns of 1947-49. Herbert Pottle, one of the first of
Smallwood’s cabinet ministers to abandon him, wrote that Smallwood saw himself as
the people’s “Abraham” leading them into a “new Canaan”, the Promised Land of
Confederation, but with a common touch: he was the “prophet of the average ‘Joe’”.1
Anyone who has grown up with the iconography of Smallwood – especially his
immodest campaign photographs – may easily accept Pottle’s view. Smallwood did
not have the support of St. John’s workers, who were tied by patronage to the anti-
Confederation politics of St. John’s business interests. Smallwood instead appealed to
the fishing people and loggers who comprised the bulk of the outport population,
leading them to believe that he would stand up against the merchants of Water Street.2
We can see something of the class expectations of an outport person in the writing
1 Herbert L. Pottle, Newfoundland, Dawn without Light: Politics, Power and People in the Smallwood
Era (St. John’s, 1979), p. 13. The author would like to thank Mark Leier, Department of History,
Simon Fraser University, for his comments on this presentation.
2 Smallwood’s ability to build on outport antipathy towards St. John’s has been well-established by
many authors. The dominance of merchant capital and household production in the outport fishery
rested on chains of credit that bound a variety of small dealers and outport merchants to the dominant
houses of St. John’s. The paternalism of outport culture meant that fishing people often identified with
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of Augustus Ricketts of White Bay, who had corresponded with Smallwood in 1952
hoping that the new premier would protect local people’s common-property timber
limits from the Bowater pulp and paper company. Ricketts made it clear that “when
we vote[d] for confederation we expect[ed] to get our limit back again”.3 The
Smallwood government did nothing to help Ricketts, favouring the pulp-and-paper
companies instead.4 Smallwood’s sympathy for capitalists over common people
became clear in his reaction to the International Woodworkers of America (IWA). In
the late 1950s, the IWA began an enormously successful membership drive and
enjoyed huge popular support; it was eventually defeated, however, in the wake of
bitter, Red-baiting opposition from the Smallwood government during the IWA’s
famous strike in 1958-9.5 Even the federal Progressive Conservative government of
John Diefenbaker condemned the Newfoundland government’s harsh suppression of
the loggers, but this was likely because of the antagonisms between the federal and
provincial regimes rather than any serious disagreement about the rights of labour.
Smallwood’s attack on the IWA was simply a more coercive aspect of the emerging
post-war consensus throughout Canada about industrial legality and the welfare state
that we now refer to as the “post-war settlement”. This consensus among state
officials and employers promised, at least to the more privileged of male workers, that
their right to bargain collectively through unions would be recognized and that wages
and benefits, through some combination of employment compensation and social
assistance from the state, would support the ability of their families to consume at
unprecedented levels. The proponents of the post-war settlement hoped to promote
economic growth by using consumerism to sustain mass production. As long as
unions played along, and did not ask for too much, they had a place in the consensus.6
The Newfoundland government’s intervention in the IWA strike revealed that part
of the post-war settlement was for workers in peripheral regions to continue to provide
as cheaply as possible the raw materials required for the mass production and mass
consumption of global capitalism. The postwar settlement recognized that such
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their local merchants against “St. John’s”. When a small outport merchant, therefore, wrote to the St.
John’s firm of F.M. O’Leary just after Confederation to gloat as he closed out his account because he
planned to buy in future from Canadian suppliers, we can too easily regard complex class antagonisms
as regional divide. See Jeff A. Webb, “The Responsible Government League and the Confederation
campaigns of 1948”, Newfoundland Studies, 5, 2 (1989), p. 218.
3 See Smallwood to Rowe, St. John’s, 21 June 1952; Ricketts to Smallwood, Westport, White Bay, 11
April 1952; and Assistant Forester to Ricketts, St. John’s, 14 July 1952, PANL, GN 31 / 2, box 61,
file 194 / 2, I, folio 20, 21-2, 32.
4 Harold Horwood, Joey: The Life and Political Times of Joey Smallwood (Toronto, 1989), pp. 153,
173-4; Richard Gwyn, Smallwood: The Unlikely Revolutionary (1968; Toronto, 1972), pp. 131-3;
“Drover, Samuel”, Encyclopedia of Newfoundland and Labrador, Volume One (St. John’s, 1967), p.
645; Frederick W. Rowe, Into the Breach: Memoirs of a Newfoundland Senator (Toronto, 1988), pp.
125-7.
5 Jerry Lembcke and William M. Tattam, One Union in Wood: A Political History of the International
Woodworkers of America (New York, 1984), pp. 155-76.
6 J.D. Sutherland, “‘We are only loggers’: Loggers and the Struggle for Development in
Newfoundland, 1929-1959”, Ph.D. thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1995. For differing views of the
meaning of the post-war settlement, see Laurel Sefton MacDowell, Renegade Lawyer: the life of J.L.
Cohen (Toronto, 2001) and Peter S. McInnis, Harnessing Labour Confrontation: Shaping the postwar
settlement in Canada, 1943-1950 (Toronto, 2002).
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workers and their families were not about to be consigned willingly to such extra-
exploitation, but that it would be the duty of the state to find a way to satisfy their
demands so that there would be no confrontation with the overall structure of
capitalism. Smallwood’s attempt at a consensus in Newfoundland was to bury the
popular anger over the IWA strike in public indignation about Term 29 of the Terms
of Union between Newfoundland and Canada. Term 29 committed the federal
government to reviewing the financial state of the new province within eight years of
its entry into Confederation. As early as 1953, Smallwood had begun to build a case
for more generous financial terms from Ottawa and for himself as a regional
champion against federal policies favouring Central Canada. In 1957, the federal
government appointed the chief justice of New Brunswick, J.B. McNair, as chair of a
royal commission to review Canada’s financial commitment to Newfoundland as set
out in Term 29. Smallwood was upset with the paltry $8 million per year in perpetuity
in increased subsidies recommended by the McNair Commission and even more so
with Diefenbaker’s initial refusal to pay even that amount. Between 1959 and 1961,
the Newfoundland premier rallied the people of the province behind his successful
fight to get the annual payments from the Diefenbaker government. Smallwood’s
prophetic vision of a better life for Newfoundlanders and Labradorians in
Confederation rested increasingly on his ability to extort money from the federal
government to fund a more affluent society in the province.7 Smallwood later
unintentionally summed up the limited nature of his version of the politics of
regionalism for Newfoundland when he stated:
84.
Eighty-four.
In all Newfoundland and Labrador.
84.
84 what?
84 schools with indoor toilets.
That was Newfoundland on the day that I became Premier.
Today: 838 schools have indoor toilets.
We have not, in those years, produced any new or original
education theory, philosophy or practice.
But we have put indoor toilets in 744 schools that didn’t have them.
That’s progress.8
Ray Blake argues that Newfoundland did not ask for economic development and
that Canada had, therefore, promised none. Instead, Canada wanted to use social-
welfare policies to raise Newfoundlanders up to Canadian standards: they would give
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7 Margaret Conrad, “The 1950s: The Decade of Development”, in E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise, eds.,
The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation (Fredericton and Toronto, 1993), pp. 401-7.
8 Joseph R. Smallwood, To You with Affection from Joey (St. John’s, 1969), p. 37. I would like to thank
Morgan Pond, then a graduate student in the Masters of Employment Relations programme at Memorial
University, for drawing my attention to this quotation as well as the quotations about Smallwood by
Pottle cited above in a seminar on labour and working-class history during the winter of 2004.
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us as many indoor toilets as anyone else.9 But we need to think about this carefully.
First, provincial and federal officials did cooperate in major economic development
initiatives. Outport resettlement was one, though it is best remembered as a later,
failed phase of Smallwood’s attempt to develop a more diversified urban and
manufacturing base for the province. Second, provincial and federal fisheries policy
moved in tandem towards modernization of the fishing industry. Provincial and
federal policies encouraged the consolidation of capital in the fishing industry and the
over-capacity which eventually led to the collapse of ground fisheries in 1992. While
capitalists benefited from these federal and provincial initiatives, communities did
not. Despite his Ottawa bashing, Smallwood depended on federal money because he
had little else with which to buy the support of the people for a regime whose
economic policies were miserable failures. The magic of Term 29 for Smallwood was
that it provided a perfect recipe for handling future local failures: blame Canada and
bury working people in the supposed privileges of mass consumerism. The problem
for working Newfoundlanders was that each failure in federal and provincial
development policy made them much more dependent on the public spectacle of such
provincial extortion rackets. Under Smallwood, Confederation excused rather than
challenged the inequalities of capitalism.
The Newfoundland government differed little from Ottawa: it used economic
policies primarily to benefit private capital, and then used the welfare state to co-opt
public support. The historically close relationship between the state and private
enterprise in every provincial and federal capital always meant that Canada did not
exist to level the extremely uneven field of capitalism. Gustavus Myers said it best in
1914 when he pointed out that Canada was little more than a coalition of financial and
industrial interests. “Government is administered at all times”, Myers pointed out,
“either directly by the beneficiaries or by the representatives of those ruling forces, no
matter by what political name they may be pleased to call themselves”.10 Liberal
historiographies, as Stanley Ryerson pointed out, have always required “a certain
reticence about the class forces and class interests” that the Fathers of Confederation
represented. No matter how they balanced their competing interests, a grand coalition
of Montreal and Toronto commercial and industrial capitalists and their lawyers
designed a state to serve their major concerns.11
The burden of regionalism was not simply a central Canadian imposition on people
throughout Atlantic Canada. Nova Scotian and New Brunswick industrialists naively
hoped that Confederation would be a great national project of financing their
metropolitan interests so that an Amherst or Saint John might be doing to the rest of
the country what Toronto and Montreal did.12 The narrow social basis of the later
Maritime Rights movement in the 1920s suggests that many people throughout the
“region” did not place much faith in regional business communities using greater
economic and political influence within Canada to the benefit of anyone but
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9 Raymond B. Blake, Canadians at Last: Canada Integrates Newfoundland as a Province (Toronto,
1994), p. 6.
10 Gustavus Myers, A History of Canadian Wealth (1914; Toronto, 1972), p. xxxiii.
11 Stanley B. Ryerson, Unequal Union: Confederation and the Roots of Conflict in the Canada, 1815-
1873 (Toronto, 1973), pp. 342-7.
12 R.T. Naylor, Canada in the European Age, 1453-1919 (Vancouver, 1987), pp. 297-313.
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themselves. If the extent of out-migration or the limited political achievements of the
Maritime Rights movement are any indications, the judgement of many Maritimers in
the 1920s appears to have been that there was little difference in exploitation and rule
by Toronto and Montreal or by Halifax and Saint John.13
Later federal regional development programmes, notwithstanding the good
intentions of individual officials, were a part of Canada’s post-war settlement: buying
regional acquiescence for the national structures of capitalist development. The
problem with this trade-off is that the post-war settlement could not contain the
exploitative force of the late-20th-century globalization of capitalism. After 1975, the
fiscal retrenchment of neo-conservatism plunged Newfoundland and Labrador into a
crisis worsened by the ecological catastrophe of the fisheries.14 Considerable
discontent remains, but is often misdirected at the apparent source of all our
misfortunes: a tight-fisted and regionally insensitive federal government. In
embracing our political loyalties, we over-emphasize the divide between Tory neo-
nationalists and Liberal federalists. Politicians from both provincial parties have
appreciated the local political capital that accumulates from public, often vicious
battles with Ottawa. Brian Peckford’s noisy disagreements with Trudeau over the
control of Newfoundland’s offshore-oil resources had its antecedent in the Term 29
battle. Clyde Wells was not straying far from the field in his fights against the Meech
Lake and Charlottetown constitutional proposals, which helped distract many people
in Newfoundland and Labrador from his confrontation with provincial public-sector
workers. While Wells became something of a Canadian hero for his staunch
federalism, it is easy to overplay his differences from Peckford. Peckford’s anti-
Trudeau appeal in many parts of Canada was considerable as was Wells’s popularity
at home as an Ottawa-basher. More important, the governments led by both premiers
waged extensive battles against organized labour, whether it was Peckford’s attack on
public-sector workers through Bill 59 in the mid-1980s or Wells’s retrenchment
assaults on such workers in the early 1990s.15
Ottawa-bashing has gained renewed respectability from proponents of
Newfoundland neo-nationalism. Some cite the “remarkable” and “passionate”
articulation of provincial grievance by some of Newfoundland’s leading capitalists
such as Craig Dobbin. Dobbin has suggested that Newfoundland would be much
better off if it had more control over its own resources.16 But consider Dobbin’s
rhetoric against his actions: during the summer of 2004, while maintaining his public
position that Newfoundland was getting a raw deal from Confederation, Dobbin’s
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13 David Frank, “The 1920s: Class and Region, Resistance and Accommodation,” in Forbes and Muise,
The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation, pp. 233-71; David Frank, J.B. McLachlan: A Biography
(Toronto, 1999), pp. 304-5.
14 Bryan D. Palmer, Working-Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1800-
1991, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1992), pp. 340-53.
15 Jerry Bannister, “The Politics of Cultural Memory: Themes in the History of Newfoundland and
Labrador in Canada, 1972-2003”, report commissioned by the Royal Commission on Renewing and
Strengthening Our Place in Canada (2003), pp. 131-6. The role of neo-nationalism in the assault on
organized labour in Newfoundland has no place in Bannister’s analysis. See Gregory S. Kealey, The
History and Structure of the Newfoundland Labour Movement (St. John’s, 1986), pp. 202-9 and Claire
Hoy, Clyde Wells: A Political Biography (Toronto, 1992), pp. 297-314. 
16 Bannister, “Politics of Cultural Memory”, pp. 141-3.
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company, Canadian Helicopters Corporation, moved its head office from St. John’s to
Vancouver. Dobbin admitted that he was too embarrassed to speak to the press about
his action, but defended the move as an act of international corporate concentration
and rationalization: “Why Vancouver and not St. John’s? Because I had 350 people
in Vancouver already working out there and I had 35 in St. John’s”.17 The CHC
incident is not the first time that one of the Atlantic provinces has suffered from the
consolidation of capital, and Dobbin’s defence would have come as no surprise to
Gustavus Myers.
I think regions are important, but in the manner of a Marxist-influenced
“structural-functionalist” approach – probably of the “dependency” sort described by
Ian McKay. The broad historical forces of late-industrial and monopoly capitalism
have produced places that have enjoyed disproportionately economic benefits and
concomitant power while other places have suffered disproportionately from
exploitation.18 The regional politics of Confederation have become largely the
mediation of competing capitalist interests for the sake of legitimizing capitalism
overall. Confederation can be more, as David Alexander pointed out a quarter of a
century ago, and we may already see signs that “new notions of happiness” are
emerging in the manner in which federalism works, such as in the case of the Atlantic
Accord.19 But these notions will do little to redress the problems of exploitation, in its
regional dimensions or otherwise, as long as they amount to federal-provincial
agreements that provide regional capitalist interests with more resources to pursue
their own programs of development while buying popular support through limited
local welfare. New notions of happiness require a more class-conscious consideration
of who benefits most from the exploitation of local resources and self-liberation from
the social and ecological ruin of mass consumerism. There are only small differences
between the local, regional and national culprits for these problems.
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17 The Independent (St. John’s), 15 August 2004 (accessed online 03 May 2004 at
http://www.theindependent.ca/article.asp?AID=298&ATID=2).
18 Ian McKay, “A Note on ‘Region’ in Writing the History of Atlantic Canada”, Acadiensis, XXIX, 2
(Spring 2000), pp. 89-101.
19 David G. Alexander, “New Notions of Happiness: Nationalism, Regionalism, and Atlantic Canada”,
in David Alexander, compiled by Eric W. Sager, Lewis R. Fischer and Stuart O. Pierson, Atlantic
Canada and Confederation: Essays in Canadian Political Economy (Toronto, 1983), pp. 79-100. This
paper originally appeared in the Journal of Canadian Studies, XV, 2 (1980), pp. 29-42. Flush with the
Atlantic Accord, and the higher royalties from the unexpected windfall of global inflation in world oil
prices, the government of Newfoundland and Labrador has since reached a settlement on pay equity
with the Canadian Union of Public Employees, Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Public
and Private Employees, Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union, and the Association of Allied
Health Professionals (see the St. John’s Telegram, 24 March 2006, p. A3).
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